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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY REGARDING CIVILIAN DIRECTOR
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

A memorandum was submitted to the Senate Committee from Mr. Allen W. Dulles, dated 25 April 1947. Mr. Dulles stated that the Agency

"should be predominantly civilian rather than military, and 'under civilian leadership. ... If previously a military man, he should not look forward to resuming a position in one of the armed services. The same should be true of his top staff. ... They should, if military, divest themselves of their rank as soldiers, of the soldiers, or airmen, and, as it were, 'take the cloth' of the intelligence service."

This testimony is substantially the same as that given orally by Mr. Dulles before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

Col. John P. Oliver, Legislative Officer for the Reserve Officers Association of The United States, together with Lt. Col. Richard Rivvill, appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and urged that the Director should be civilian,

"because he should represent all aspects of the Government, not merely those concerned with the military,

They further felt that, if the Director should be a member of the armed forces, he should be required to serve as a civilian. After conferences with General Vandenberg and Admiral Hillenkoetter, undertaken at the request of Senator Saltonstall, the opposition of the Reserve Officers Association was withdrawn.

In a memorandum submitted by Mr. Charles S. Cheston, formerly Assistant Director, OSS, a demand was made that there should be a civilian Director, on the grounds of the need for specially trained personnel in the fields of political, economic and technological intelligence and international relations, the need of continuity of leadership, and the necessity of freeing the Central Intelligence Agency from the rigidity of the military system.

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Before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, adverse testimony was given by Mr. Peter Vischer, Col. Grombach, Brig. Gen. Hayes Kroner, USA, Ret., and Mr. Fred Lyons, a Foreign Service officer. In addition, Col. Carter Clarke and another Colonel from the War Department were scheduled to appear but were unavailable at the time of the hearing. [REDACTED]

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Peter Vischer testified in closed session in favor of having a civilian Director. In addition, two members of the Committee have stated that he introduced into the record a copy of NIA Directive No. 5 (Classification; Top Secret), which led at least two members of the Committee to ask you how it was possible for Vischer to have obtained a copy of this document. You will also recollect that Vischer was the source of most of the adverse material appearing in the press, particularly the articles in the Times-Herald by Walter Trohan and John Edgar Hoover.

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General Kroner was Deputy G-2 of the War Department and Chief of the Military Intelligence Service in the early days of the war. He did not take a position on whether the Director should be a civilian. [REDACTED]

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In July, it was discovered that an article adverse to Central Intelligence was being prepared for Harper's Magazine by Fletcher Pratt. This information was furnished me by a Colonel of the Marine Corps at Quantico, Virginia, who stated that Pratt had been invited to Washington by G-2 specifically to do this article, and that "the red carpet had been rolled out for him." Immediately following his meeting in Washington, Pratt went to Quantico and spent an evening or week-end with my informant. The Colonel tried to dissuade him from writing so biased an article, and took a pro-CIG view. However, Pratt indicated he needed the money which Harper's was paying for the article and that he was convinced of the accuracy of the accusations against CIG that he had heard in the War Department. He did not think it worth his while to hear the other side of the story. The Colonel told me it was his impression that the War Department was out to "get" CIG and that the comments expressed to Pratt had been extremely bitter. [REDACTED]

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